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Abstract 
Helmink, L., Resolution and type theory, Science of Computer Programming 17 (1991) 119-138. 
In this paper, an inference mechanism is proposed for proof construction in Constructive Type 
Theory. An interactive system that implements this rniihad has been dcve!oped. Scme interesting 
proofs can be derived automatically. 
Keywords. Type theory, calculus of constructions, typed lambda calculus, natural deduction. 
‘r. ktroduction 
A method is presented to perform unification based top down proof construction 
for Constructive Type Theory, thus offering a well-founded, elegant and powerful 
underlying formalism for a proof development system. It combines the advantages 
of Horn clause resolution and higher order natural deduction style theorem proving. 
No theoretical contribution to Constructive Type Theory is claimed. [18] shows 
that the method applies to generalised type systems (GTS) [3], and thus applies to 
many differents variants of type theory, e.g. systems in the families of AUTOMATH 
[6], Martin-Liif [25], the Calculus of Constructions [9], LF [16], Elf [29]. Here, the 
method is presented for the Calculus of Constructions. To illustrate the method, a 
full derivation example is included. 
The problem addressed in this paper is to construct an object in a given context, 
given its type. This amounts to higher order theorem proving. This paper demon- 
strates that this construction problem can be handled by Horn clause resolution, 
provided that the set of available Horn clauses is continuously adapted to the context 
in which the proof is conducted. This rests on a mechanism that provides a simple 
clausal interpretation for the assumptions in a context. The method is not complete, 
due to the expressive power of type theory. Although the provided inference steps 
suggest certain search strategies (tactics), these issues are outside the scope of this 
paper. A proof environment based on the method, named Constructor, has been 
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&veloped within Esprit project 1222: “Genesis” [ 18,191. Constructor implements 
the method for generalised type systems, a generalisation of the Calculus of Construc- 
tions used in this paper. Experiments with this system demonstrate the power and 
efficiency of the method. 
Here is an overview of the paper: 
e Section 2 summarizes the Calculus of Constructions, the specific variant of 
Constructive Type Theory that will be used to explain the inference method. 
0 Section 3 presents the inference method. 
@ Section 4 discusses completeness of ‘he proposed method. 
0 Section 5 illustrates the method by means of a full derivation example. 
@ Section 6 describes the Constructcr proof development environment. 
@ Section 7 discusses related work. 
e Section 8 concludes with a discussion. 
2. Constructive Type Theory (CR) 
We assume familiarity with Constructive Type Theory [6, 8, 9, 14, 221, a variant 
of the propositions as types paradigm. This section describes the particular system 
of interest. We shall use a system developed by Coquand, a version of the Calculus 
of Constructions. It must be emphasized that this is just one of the possible variants 
for which the presented proof construction method is applicable. 
2.1. Terms 
The syntactic formation rules for the terms in the system are defined as: 
constant, viz.. one of {prop, type, kind}. 
variable, denoted by an identifier. 
Ax: A. B, typed abstraction, where A and B xe terms, and x a variable. 
l7x:A. B, generalized Cartesian product of types B indexed over x of type A, where 
A and B are terms, and x a variable. 
(A B)? application, where A and B are terms (function and argument). Application 
associates to the left, so we will write (a b c) for ((a b) c). 
A typing is a construction of the form [t: T], where t and T are terms. The intuition 
behind this is that T is the type of t. Types may have types themselves, agd we will 
refer to such expressions as domains. Four levels of expressions are distinguished 
in the hierarchy of types: 0-, l-, 2-, and 3-expressions, where n-expressions serve 
as types of (n + l)-expressions (n = 0, 1,2). There is only one O-expression: the 
constant “supertype” kind. We introduce two predefined constants as primitive 
l-expressions (kinds) of the system: the kind type, the set containing all “plain” 
types (2-expressions), and the kind prop, that plays an identical role and is treated 
similarly, but which is inhabited by propositions (2-expressions). The level of 
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3-expressions contains objects and proofs. In many versions of the Calculus of 
Constructions, type and prop are identified (usually denoted “*” or “Type”). Here 
we will explicitly distinguish between them to avoid possible confusion. This is 
however not essential to the formalism. 
2.2. Correctness 
In this section, we will give type rules describing what correct terms are. To this 
end, a notion of contexts is needed first. 
A context is a list of assumptions and definitions: 
assdef, . . . , assdef,, (n 2 0) 
An assumption is of the form [Xi :Ai] and introduces Xi as a variable of type Ai. 
A dejnition is of the form [Xi E ai :Ai] and introduces Xi as an abbreviation of the 
correct term ai of type Ai. Variables may be declared at most once. The free variables 
occurring in ai and Ai must have been declared earlier in the context, i.e., SV(Ai) E 
{x 1, . . . , xi-,} and SY(ai) C_ {XI,. . . , xi-l}. 
We will use r as a metavariable over contexts. Well-formedness of a context r 
will be denoted webformed( We will write r, [x:A] to denote the context r 
extended with the assumption [x:A], and rl, Tz for the concatenation of contexts 
r, and Tz. The symbol “ti” represents the empty context. A sequent is an expression 
of the form r t- [a:A], denoting that [a:A] is a correct typing in the well-formed 
context f. The predicate constant(x) denotes that x is one of the constants type, 
prop or kind. We will write B[a/x] to denote substitution of the term a for the free 
occurrences of the variable x in the expression B. We will write “=p6” to denote 
the transitive reflexive closure of /3- and S-reduction. p-reduction corresponds to 
the usual notion in typed lambda-calculus, and S-reduction denotes local expansion 
of definitions that have been introduced in the context. Note that both p- and 
S-reduction are context-dependent. We assume equality modulo cu-conversion 
whenever necessary. This can be achieved by using De Bruijn indices [5] or 
Barendregt’s variable convention [2]. 
Well-formedness of contexts and correct typing of terms is inductively defined as: 
[G] well-formed (fl) (empty) 
[la] If welf&rmed(f) then r I- [type:kind]. 
[lb] If well-formed(f) then r I- [prop:kind]. 
(kinds) 
[2a] If r t- [A:K] and constant(K) then well-formed(f, [x:A]). 
[2b] If r I- [a:A] then well#ormed(f, [c= a:A]). 
(introduction) 
[3a] If well-formed(f) and [x:A] E f, Glen .[‘I-- [x:A]. 
[3b] If well-formed(f) and [c= a:A]E f, then f I- [c:A]. 
(selection) 
[4] If f, [x:A] i- [b:B] then f I- [Ax:A.b:flx:A.B]. (A-abstraction) 
[5] If I-‘, [x:A] I- [B:K] and constant(K) then f t- [Llx:A.B:K]. 
(n-abstraction) 
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[6] If r t- [a:A] and r I-- [b:Ux:A.B] then r I- [(ba):B[a/x]]. (application) 
[7] If r I- [a:A) and r t- [B:K] and constant(K) and A =ssB then r t- [a:B]. 
(type conversion) 
Details and properties of the described system can be found in [is, 9, 17, 22, 24,3]. 
2.3. Interpretation and use 
If, for a dependent product type Rx:A. B, x does not occur free in B (x E 9”V( B)), 
the type simplifies, as usual, to the ordinary function type A + B. In case A:prop, A 
is considered a proposition and a typing [a:A] is interpreted as: a is a proof for 
A, i.e., a proposition plays the role of the type of its proofs. This means that a 
proposition is considered valid if and only if it is inhabited. The system described 
contains intuitionistic higher order predicate logic. For example, if B:prop, then 
nx:A. B can be interpreted as the universally quantified proposition Vx:A.B. If x 
does not occur free in B and A:prop and B:prop, then l7x:A.B can be interpreted 
as the intuitionistic implication A+ B. The Calculus of Constructions formalism 
thus provides a definition language that can be and has been used to formalize and 
mechanically verify many parts of mathematics. Texts in this language are written 
in the form of theories (books in AUTOMATH terminology). Theories are CTT 
contexts. For a field of interest, assumptions allow the axiomizatfon of the primitive 
notions, whereas the definitions allow abbl, . . ..__ _ __ __ ____ --*;dnn nf rlerived 90,iop.s &,e lemmas. 
3. CTI’ proof construction method 
It is a well-known fact, that correctness of sequents r t- [t: T] (t has typF: T in 
context r) in Constructive Type Theory and related systems is decidable, even 
ctiasibly decidable, and several proof checkers exist that mechanically determine 
correctness for given CTT theories [23, 10,8]. For a proof construction system, the 
objective is not to verify whether a given object has a certain given type, but, for a 
given type, to attempt construction of an inhabitant of this type. More precisely: 
given a context (theory) r and a type A, the objective is to construct an object p 
such that r I- [ p:A]. For propositions, this corresponds to finding a proof object. 
The repsral problem with goal directed proof construction in Constructive Type 
Theory is that direct backward chaining with the correctness rules of Section 2.2 is 
hardly possible. Therefore, the approach is to extract from the given formalization 
a sound set of derived rules, that do allow easy backward inference. These derived 
rules then serve as the primitive proof steps of the system. 
3.1. Horn clause derivations 
In the method, CTT sequents will be derived using Horn clause resolution. In 
goal directed proving, the idea is to start off with a goal to be proven, and to replace 
goals by appropriate subgoals by resolution with inference rules [31]. Horn clause 
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inference rules consist of a (possib’; empty) set of antecedents S, . . . fk snd one 
conclusion S. Horn clauses will be denoted: St-S, . . . Sk. In the method, antecedents 
and conclusions will all be (ITT sequents. Sequents may contain logical variables 
over CTT terms. To avoid confusion with CTT variables, we will denote logical 
variables by identifiers prefixed with a “#” symbol. Logical variables are considered 
to be universally quantified over clauses. A term is grounded if it does not contain 
logical variables. A context will be called grounded if it contains grounded terms 
only. The meaning of a Horn clause is that if instantiations for the logical variables 
can be found, such that the antecedent sequents are correct, then the associated 
consequent is a correct sequent. A Horn clause will be considered &id if its meaning 
is correct with respect to the correctness rules of CIT. Unification determines how 
two rules can be combined into derivations. A derivation for a sequent is either a 
Horn clause conciuding that sequent, or it is a derivation where an antecedent 
sequent Si is replaced by the antecedents of a Horn clause concluding S:, after 
unifying Si and Si. If no antecedents are left in a derivation, the derivation is 
complete and serves as a justification for th : correctness of its conclusion sequent. 
Derivations correspond to derived Horn clauses and have the same interpretation. 
The queries considered consist 01 one goal of the form r I- [#P:A], where r must 
be a grounded, well-formed context, A must be a grounded, correct domain, and 
#P is a logical variable. For a given query S, the derivation process starts with the 
trivial derivation “S c S”, which is obviously valid. The objective is to transform 
this derivation by resolution with valid Horn clauses, until the derivation “S’ *” 
is reached. S’ is then a correct instance of S. 
Derivations and Horn clatlies will be of the form: r k [p:A] e 
rt I- [p,:A,] . . . r,l I-- [ P,~:A,,]. The following invariant properties will hold for all 
derivations (but not necessarily for Horn clauses): 
1. All contexts r and I’, . . . 17, will be grounded and well-formed. 
2. rcrr* ,‘.., rcr,,. 
3. For any logical variable #P occurring in the type field Ai of a subgoal 
c I- [pi:Ai], #PE {PI . . . pi-,). If an ob ject field pi of a subgoal Ti I- [pi:Ai] is 
not a logical variable, thfn for any logical variable #P occurring in pi, #PE 
(P I*..Pi-11. 
4. For any logical .driable #P occurring in the object field p of the conclusion 
r I- E ~4, #P E {P, . . . p,,). 
The first property reflects the fact that construction always tt;kes place within a 
known context. The second property states that contexts can be extended during 
backward proving. The third property ensures that logical variables are “introduced 
belore use”. The fourth property guarantees that the conclusion of a derivation will 
be grounded when all subgoals have been solved i : -,c type fieid 11 of a derivation 
conclusion is grounded from the start). For our queries r t- [SEA] this implies 
that an object SP of the requested type A has been constructed. Note that the trivial 
derivations that correspond to our queries of interest have al’ he required properties. 
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It turns out that we can avoid a problem that usually arises with inference rules 
over sequents, viz. unification over contexts. The reason for this is that in contrast 
to P’ neral purpose higher order theorem provers as presented in e.g. [27, 28 and 
131, the method inferences at the object level, not at the meta-level. This is possible 
because the method is specialized for type theory only; it is not a generic inference 
method over arbitrary sequents. Contexts will be treated in a special way, and it is 
sufficient to unify over typings. Our goals, that denote CTT sequents, will be regarded 
as tuples with a typing and a context. 
For the method to work, it is necessary that contexts occurring in derivations are 
grounded, so that (1) we do not unify over contexts at all, and (2) we can extract 
the necessary object level horn clauses directly from contexts. The exact conse- 
quences of this restriction will be alluded to later. 
In the subsequent sections, valid Horn clauses will be derived. These Horn clauses 
will not violate the given invariant properties for derivations. Some of the Horn 
clauses correspond directly to correctness rules for type theory and are of interest 
to all subgoals in a derivation. The problem is that no suitable Horn clause can be 
given for the application rule (rule 6), on account of the substitution. A solution 
for this problem is presented, that rests on a mechanism to provide a direct clausal 
interpretation for the assumptions in a context. The Horn clauses thus obtained 
cover derivation steps that can construct the necessary application terms. This is 
the crux of the method. For any given subgoal Ti t- [ pi:Ai], this mechanism, when 
applied to the context Ti, allows derivation of a set of valid Horn clauses that are 
candidates for resolution on this particular subgoal. A proposal for this mechanism 
was first suggested by Ahn [l]. 
3- .L. Unification and type conversion 
Unification determines whether a clause is applicable in a given situation. 
Unification will also handle the type conversion rule (rule 7), dealing with equality 
of types. It is important to observe that it is sufficient to provide unification over 
typings, not over contexts (although context information is of course relevant for 
p- and S-reductions during unification). Unifying typings [P:A] and [P’:A’] will 
be achieved by unifying the objects P and P’ and subsequently unifying the types 
A and A’. For types, the unification is with respect to P-and &equality. Although 
&equality for objects is not explicit in the correctness rules, it is also desirab!e to 
identify p- (and S-) equivalent terms. This is justified by the closure under reduction 
property, and corresponds to proof normalization [8,10,16]. Because we unfold 
derived clauses completely, it is desirable to augment object unification with outer- 
most q-equality, to ensure reachability of objects in q-normal form. 
Unification for expressions in typed h-calculus with respect to cy, p and possibly 
q-conversion requires complete higher order unification. For simply typed A-calculus 
this problem has a pcssibly infinite set of solutions and is known to be semidecidable, 
in the sense that if two terms do not unify, search algorithms for unifiers may diverge 
[21]. [21] also gives a comp!ete algorithm for this problem in simply typed h-calculus. 
In the more complicated case of the Calculus of Constructions, where types are 
also terms in typed h-calculus, it is not yet completely clear. Elliott [ 121 and Pym 
[30] have independently extended Huets algorithm to dependent ypes for the logical 
framework LF (see also [29]). Dowek [ml] is working towards extending the 
algorithm up the Barendregt “cube” 131, a theory that gives a classification of type 
systems and that includes the Calculus of Constructions. It is too early to report 
results. For implementations of the method, sound approximations for higher order 
unification can always be used. Such approximations can be very usable in practice 
(Section 6 gives an example) although tht y affect completeness, of course. 
3.3. Kinds rule 
The kinds rule (rule 1) is directly equivalent to the valid Horn clauses: 
f I- [type: kind] c”. 
r I- [prop: kind] e. 
For any subgoal Tj I- [ pi:Ai], such a rule applies if [pitAi] unifies with [iype:kind] 
or [ prop:kind]. r is not treated as a logical variable. Because contexts in our 
derivations are always grounded and well-formed, the well-formedness check on Ti 
(required in rule 1) is needless. 
3.4. Lambda abstraction rule 
The lambda abstraction rule (rule 4) corresponds to the valid Horn clause: 
I- I- [Ax:#A.#B : lIx:#A.#T] e I’, [x:#A] t- [U?:$T]. 
The typing of a goal of the form rj I- [P: nx:A.T] may be unified with the typing 
in the conclusion of this rule, unifying P with hx:#A.#B and resulting in the new 
stripped subgoal [#B:#T], to be solved in the context I’i extended with the typing 
[x:#A]. r does not play the role of a logical variable. To ensure that this new 
context is grounded and well-formed, the restriction is imposed that A must be 
grounded and correct domain, thus preventing logical variables over domains to be 
introduced in the context. For example, this rule cannot be used to find a proof for 
an implication #A + B, because this would introduce an unknown assumption 
[p:#A] in the context. 
3.5. Pi abstraction rule 
The pi abstraction rule (rule 5) corresponds to the valid Horn clause: 
r I- [flx:#A.#B : #K] e r, [x#A] I- [#B:#K]. 
For goals of the form I-, t- [l7x:A.B: K], application of this rule results, after 
unification of typings, in a stripped subgoal [B: K 1, to be solved in the context r, 
extended with the typing [x:A]. K must be a constant. Though this check has to 
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be postponed if K is not grounded, it can be demonstrated that this need never 
occur, and K must be either type or prop. To ensure that the new context is grounded 
and well-formed, again the restriction is imposed that A must be a grounded and 
correct domain. For example, this prevents using this rule on a goal ri I- [#P:prop]. 
3.6. Derived clauses 
The application ru:e (rule 6) cannot be translated directly to a valid Horn clause, 
on account of the substitution. A solution is offered, for which the following theorem 
is essential: 
Correctness of a sequent of the form 
I- I- [C : Ux, : A, . . . ~lx,,:&.B] 
is equivalent o the validity of the Horn clause: 
f, I-’ I- [(C #x, . . . 8X”) : B[Slrx,/x, , . . . , #x,,/x,,]] c 
I-L, I-’ I- [#x, : A,] 
r, I-’ I- ‘#x2 :AJ#x,/x,]] 
. . . 
l-, I-’ I- [#x,, : A&x,/x,, . . . , ttx,,_,/x,J]. 
where #x,, . . . ,8x,, are the logical variables of the Horn clause. The context IY, r’ 
denotes any well-formed context extension of 1: Note that all possible occurrences 
of the CTT variables Xi have been replaced by corresponding logical variables #Xi. 
For a complete proof of this theorem the reader is referred to [lS]. For n = 0, the 
set of premises is empty and the application in the consequent simplifies to the 
object C. The selection rule (rule 3a and 3b) justifies that the theorem is in particular 
applicable to all introductions and definitions occurring in any well-formed context 
r, i.e. 
For all C’TT variables c, if 
[c:LIx,:A,... l7x,, : A,,.B] E I- 
or 
[c=c’:lIx,:A,. ..IIx,,:A,,.B]EI- 
this theorem guarantees that: 
r I- [(c #x, .. . #x,~) : B[#x,/x, , . . . , #x,/x,]] + 
I- I-- [#x, : A,] 
I’ I- [#x2: AJXx,/x,]] 
. . . 
r t- Dk, :&h/x, 3 .. . , ~x,dxn-,ll~ 
This result is now used to interpret the introductions and definitions in a context 
in this clausal form, thus providing the possible apykation candidates. The idea 
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is to “unfold” the top level IT-abstractions for context elements to clauses. For any 
goal r I- E, all ciauses thus obtained from the grounded context r are available as 
valid Horn c!auses for resolution on this goal. It is important to note that the context 
r is the same for the consequent and the antecedents of the Horn clauses thus 
obtained. Because the context is not affected by application of these clauses, it is 
sufficient to resolve the typing E of a goal with the typing of the consequent of the 
clause, and pass the context r directly to the antecedents. Henceforth, we will omit 
the context parameter r for these clauses. 
Although for a given context element of type XIX, : A, . . . Hx,, : A,,.B (where B is 
not itself a II-abstraction) the theorem gives n + 1 different valid Horn clauses, it 
is sufficient to provide the completely unfolded clause with n antecedents. If the 
clause has been unfolded too far to unify directly with a sequent, this can be 
compensated by first resolving the sequent with the lambda abstraction rule. The 
smal! price to pay is that the resulting proofs may contain q-redexes. If desired, 
these can be reduced immediately. See also Section 5. 
Note that this mechanism now covers both the application rule (rule 6) and the 
selection rule (rule 3). Rule 2 (context introduction) is handled by the h-abstraction 
rule and the IT-abstraction rule. Note that these rules are the only ones that can 
extend contexts. 
4. Completeness 
An interesting question is whether the method is complete in the sense that a top 
down derivation can be constructed for all correct inhabitants (modulo object 
conversion) of a given type (checking is complete). Note that completeness is of 
course determined by the completeness of the higher-order unification procedure. 
But what exactly are the consequences of the restriction that we impose on the 
context, viz. that it is always grounded? 
We already, saw that our queries of interest are not affected by the restriction. 
Now consider the effect of the restriction during the inferencing process. It should 
be clear that only the lambda rule and the pi rule are affected by the restriction, as 
they may extend a context during resolution. For issues related to completeness (at 
least in a non-deterministic sense), the following observation is important: due to 
the third invariant property on derivations, we only need to consider goals where 
the type field of the conclusion is grounded, because any logical variable #P occurrirg 
there can be instantiated by first solving the associated goal where #P is introduced. 
This implies that the partiality of the lambda-abstraction rule poses no fundamental 
restrictions, because it can be circumvented by postponing resolution on the goal 
in question. It is clear that the restriction on the applicability of the pi-abstraction 
rule poses real limitations: it explicitly restricts querying for arbitrary 2-expressions, 
i.e., it refuses to enumerate 211 Ftissible n-abstracted propositions or types. For 
instance, not all solutions #A to a subgcal of the form r t- [#A:prop] will be 
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constructed. This is related to a fundamental problem. The expressive power of 
CTT is such, that it does allow the construction of proofs that involve e.g. induction 
loading, where some stronger proposition is needed to construct a proof for a weaker 
one. The resulting proofs will not have the subformula property. Automatic top 
down construction of such proofs is unattainable in general, because an ‘oracle’ is 
needed. Since it is possible to enumerate all propositions (or types), the method 
can be made complete, in a non-deterministic sense, by replacing the pi rule by an 
enumerator algorithm. This approach is however pointless for practical purposes. 
The iuteractive assistance of users is essential for such proofs. 
In summary, the method as presented is not complete. However, the restriction 
only affects construction of propositions and types. This is directly related to a 
fundamental problem in theorem proving. 
5. Derivation example 
As an example, consider the following correct theory fib: 
[nat : type], 
[O: nat], 
1s: lIx:nat. nat], 
[< : lTx:nat. lIy:nat. prop], 
[axiom 2 :l7x:nat. (< x (sx))], 
[trans: lTx:nat. l7y:nat. Ilz:nat. 
l7p:(< xy). 179:(< yz). (< x2)], 
[ ind : ITp : 17x: na t. prop. 
Kg:(p 0). 
17h:l7n:nat. IIhyp:(pn). (p (sn)). 
ITz : nat. ( p z)], 
[ predl = hx: nat. (< 0 (sx)):l7x:nat,prop] 
. . . 
To elucidate the method, a to--down derivation is now presented for the 
theorem Vy: nat. ( predl y), i.e., a proof object #P is sought, such that 
TO I- [#P: l7y:nat. ( predl y)]. The associated trivial derivation for the query is: 
I’O~[[#P:17y:nat.(predly)] c r,,~-[#P:fly:nat.(predly)]. 
The Horn clauses available for resolution are: 
I- I- [hx:#A.#B : Dx:#A.# T] c I’, [x:#A] I- [#B:# 7-l. 
I- t- [l-Ix:#A.#B : #K] e JY, [x:#A] I- [#B:#K]. 
viz. the lambda abstraction rule and the pi abstraction rule (the kinds rule is of no 
relevance to this example). These Horn clauses are always available for goals. For 
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a given goal, they are extended with Horn clauses that can be obtained from the 
unfolded context elements of the goal. For the antecedent in the given trivial 
derivation this means: 
[nat : type] e. 
[0: naf] t-. 
[(s #X) : nat] ck [#X : nat]. 
[(<#X # Y) : prop] C [#X : nat][# Y: nat]. 
[ (axiom1 #X) : (<#X (s #X))] + [#X : nat]. 
[(trans#X#Y#Z#P#Q):(<#X#Z)] t- 
[#X:nat][# Y:nat][?lZ:nat] 
[#P:(< #X # Y)][#Q:(< #Y WI. 
[(ind bP #G #H $2): (#P #Z)] C 
[SfP: l7x:nat. prop3[#G : (#PO)] 
[#H :Rn:nat. L%yp:(#P n). (#P (s n))][trZ: nat]. 
[(predl #X) : prop] * [#X : nat]. 
where TO has been omitted from the sequents. Similar ciauses can be constructed 
for extensions of To. The only rule applicable to our derivation is the lambda 
abstraction rule. Resolution gives: 
To I- [#P: nj,:nat. (predl y)] e To3 [y:nat] t- [#P’: (predl y)]. 
instantiating #P to hy:nat.#P’. In the extended context of the subgoal, a derived 
clause for y ([y:nat] t .) is now avaiLAle. Resolution with the induction clause 
(ind) from the context gives: 
To t- [#P: l7y:nat. (predl y)] t 
To, [y:nat] t- [ predl : l7x:nat. prop] 
To, [y:nat] I- [#G : (predl O)] 
&,, [y:nat] I- [#H : 17n:nat. L%yp:( pvedl 4. (predl (d)l 
To, [y:nat] t- [ymt]. 
instantiating #P’ to (ind S P” #G #H #Z), #P” to predl, and #Z to y. Note that this 
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requires higher order unification. The first subgoal is grounded and can be checked, 
but this goal can also be solved after resolution with the lambda abstraction rule, 
provided that the unification knows that predl is equivalent to [x:nat](predl x) 
(outermost q-equivalence). The last subgoal is solved directly with the Horn clause 
for y from the context. The derivation thus becomes: 
To I- [#P: l7y:nat. (predl y)] t- 
T,,, [y:nat] t- [#G: (predl O)] 
I& [y:nat] I- [#H Ilknat. lThyp:(predln).(predl (s n))l. 
The first subgoal resolves with the Horn clause for axiom1 from the context, 
instantiating #G to (axiom1 0) and leaving [O:nat] as trivial subgoal that can be 
resolved immediately. The remaining subgoal is stripped twice with the lambda 
abstraction rule. The derivation is now: 
&-, t- [#P: ny:nat. (predl y)] c rr I- [IH’: (predl (s n))l. 
instantiating #H to An:nat.hhyp:(predl n). #H’. r, stands for To, [y:nat], [n:nat], 
[hyp:( predl n)]. The remaining proof obligation is now resolved with the context 
clause for transitivity (trans): 
I&-[[#P:ITy:nat.(predly)](=T,t-[O:nat] 
rl I-[[#Y:nat] 
r, i-- [(s (S n)): nut] 
r, t-pwi :(~owj] 
r, t- [so: (-c #Y (S (S n))]. 
instantiating %H’ to (truns 0 # Y (s (s n) j #PI $0). The first and third subgoal are 
eliminated with context clauses from r, for 0, s and n. Because these subgoals are 
grounded, this amounts to checking. Resolving the last subgoal with axiom1 instanti- 
ates #Q to (axiom1 (s n)) and # Y to (s n). The derivation has become: 
r,t-[#P:fly:nat.(predly)]+T,+[(sn):nat] 
r,i-[wi:(c O(W))] 
rI C [(s n) : natj. 
The proof is completed with the context clauses for s, n and hyp. The complete 
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proof #P is now: 
hy : nat.( ind predl 
(axiom1 0) 
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hn:nat.hhyp:(predl n). 
(trans 0 (s n) (s (s n)) hyp (axiom1 (s n))) 
Note that this proof is an q-redex. This is due to the fact that derived clarises: are 
unfolded as far a s possible here, thus constructing applications that are provided 
with the full number of arguments. If outermost q-conversion of objects is provided, 
the q-normal proof can also be derived. 
6. The Constructor proof environment 
This section gives a short description of an interactive proof environment, n:-lmed 
Constructor, that implements an inference machine based on the described ntetbod. 
The machine enforces correctness of proof construction in generalised type systems, 
including the Calculus of Constructions. The mouse-based interface k~< beeh &Glt 
using the Genesis system, the tool generator that resulted from Esprit proje::t $222 
Details of the Constructor system can by found in [l&20]. Here, we wilt exylaf;: 
its most important features. 
When using Constructor, there is always a global context &resent, which k tk 
theory that formalizes a domain of interest. A proof editor is provided in whick 
conjunctions of queries can be posed, and that admits application of correct proqk’ 
steps. Queries are interpreted in the global context. Queries are typings of the &K&W 
[A: B]. Figures 1 and 2 present some screen images of the system (for the syr?&x 
used in the figures see Section 6.1). 
Both interactive user-guided infere,,, -,e and automatic search are possible and may 
intermingle. In interactive mode the user may, for a selected goal, choose a ciati~e 
from a menu with resolution candidates. Optionally, the system checks instantiak?d 
subgoals that may arise after resolution steps. Currently only one default search 
strategy or tactic (tactical in LCF terminology) is present for automatic cearch. It 
uses a consecutively bounded depth-first search strategy. The maximum search depth 
must be specified interactively. Alternative solutions are generated uporj request= 
Facilities to “undo” user or tactic choices are provided. The resolution r&fiod itscif 
is used (by way of bootstrapping) for correctness checking of CWJWGS SW! fecal 
context introductions. Completed derivations may be added to the @abaJ r3nteXg 
as lemmas. To this end, they must be given a name and wilt be avnilab?:: fcr u5e in 
subsequeiit queries. It is possible to “freeze” definitions, i.e., to hide their c:r?ntefits 
and treat them as axioms. In case of clash of variable names WClahX, ufriobre 
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ExfContext/nat 
Quary file: Ew/Context/query$ 
[ => == [a b:prop]{p:a)b : {a b:prop)prop] xfy 186 /* infix Impllcatlon */ 
[ nat : type1 
E! 
: nat] 
: {x:nat)natl fy 2900 
[:< : fw y:nat)prop] xfy 288 
/* natural nunbers */ 
j* zero =/ 
/* prefix successor :; 
/* less predicate 
[ axloml : {x:nat)(x<Sx)] /* first axiom */ 
[ trans : {x y z:nat) x<y => y<z => x<zl /* transitivity less */ 
[ ind : {p : {x:nat)prop){g : (p g)3 /* induction axiom */ 
{h : {n:nat)Chyp:(p n))(p $n))Ez : nat3 (p r)l 
[ predl == [x:nat](g<tx) : {x:nat)prop] 
‘Check 66Smart 68Analyze &Student Cl Alt 
t[y:natl(ind prod1 I!g ([n:astlChyp:(predl n)lWC) y) 
cy : natl 
: natI 
f&p : (predl a)1 
I- trc : (predl $a)1 
: Xy:naWpredl y> I * 
Fig. 1. Here, we are in the middle of an interactive session, solving the query from the example in the 
previous section. The second window contains the global context. For each goal, candidate clauses for 
resolution can be selected fro111 a menu. The proof under conwuction is collected in the head of the 
derivation. Note the different local context extensions for the different subgoals. 
variable names are generated by numbering. Textual editing of theories and queries 
is provided in the environment itself. 
The special handling of contexts can be implemented efficiently. For example, 
translation of context elements to clauses only needs to be done once, because the 
main theorem guarantees that clauses remain valid in extended contexts (this is due 
to the Let that CTT is monotonic). Verifying well-formedness of contexts can be 
done incrementally. Contexts can be shared amongst goals. 
Apart from the application Tule (rule 6) and the selection rule (rule 3), which are 
handled by the method proposed, the Constructor system is parameterized with 
respect to the correctness ru:es fc- type theory, i.e., the system can handle different 
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g Check-Context 
Context file: Ex/Tarskl/tarskll 
Query f 1 le: Ex/Tarskl/tarski . theory 
Bntext Representation 3 cn’ Bracketing CNomal Scheme G Vertical 
E -> == [a b: type]{x:a}b : => {a b:type}type] xfy lea == [a b:prop]{assun:a]b : {a b: prop)prop] xfy 100 
t : type1 
:= 
: {x y:t)prop] xfy 308 
: (x y:t)propl xfy 408 /* leq */ 
leqtrans : {x y z:t} x<=y => 
$ant Isym : {w .y : t} 
y<=z => x<=z ] 
x<= 
3 
=> y<=x => x=y ] 
/* transftivity of <= */ 
/* antlsywnetry of <= */ 
: (pred:{x:t]prop t] 
;itz;b : {pred:{x:t}prop]{y:t)(pred y) => y<=(lub pred) ] 
: {pred:{x:t)prop]Cy:t]({z:t)(pred z) => z<=y)=>((lub pred) <= y)] 
f : t->t] 
Incr : {x y:t) x<=y => (f x)<=(f y)] 
PO == [u: t] u<=(f u) : . Qprop] 
xo == (lub po) : t] 
Theorem == 
(1s 
s 
antlsyfn (f x0) x0 
upperb po (f no) 
(incr x0 (f x0) 
(least po (f x0) 
([z:t][assum:(po r)] 
(leqtrans z (f z) (f xo) assun (incr z xo (upperb po z assun))))))) 
(least po (f x0) 
([z:t][assun:(po z)] 
(f x0)=x0 
(leqtrans z (f L) (f xo) assun (Incr t xo (upperb po z assun)))))) : 
] 
@Student Cl Alt 
Vhoopy!! I found a solutlan all by myself’ 
Cl51 5 
[(leqmtiv (f xo) xo (upperb po (f IO) (her xo (f x01 (leastpo (f xo) ([~:~;l[assum: 
't 
Fig. 2. Proving Tarski’s Lemma [22]. After automatically constructing a proof of the fixed point property 
for the given witness, the proof has been added to the context as a definition (named “Theorem”). The 
proof is conducted in a version of the Calculus of Constructions. The associated completed derivation 
in the bottom window is only partly visible here. The search strategy confirms that the proofs given by 
Huet [22] are indeed the shortest proofs. 
versions and extensions of type theory. For example, it poses no problems to interpret 
various dialects of AUTOMATH [6, lo]. 
6.1. Technical details 
In Constructor, typed abstraction is denoted [x: A]& whereas typed product is 
denoted as {x: A}B. Multiple variable introductions are permitted, e.g. [x_r:A]B 
denotes [x: A][y:A]B. Variables and definitions that are introduced can be declared 
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as fix operators, much like in a Prolog fashion. For example, 
“[_j = = [a b:prop](p:a)b: (a b:prop)prop] xfy 100” 
declares “3” (implication) as a right associative infix operator with priority level 
100. Application is treated as a left-associative infix operator. Bracketing is used in 
the usual way to over-rule priorities. Logical variables are prefixed with a ‘3” symbol. 
The built-in unification procedure implements a simple approximation of higher 
order unification with the following characteristics: 
l Higher order structural matching 
First order unification where logical variables for functors match structurally, e.g. 
“(#F 0)” unifies with “(WC 0)” yielding unifier #F = sue. 
@ Alpha conversion 
The unification is modulo the name of bound variables, e.g. “[x:nat)x” equals 
“ [y : natly”. 
l Beta conversion 
The built in unification procedure will reduce /3-redexes if necessary. To ensure 
that the reduction is always sound, a goal is added to demonstrate that the argument 
will have the required domain type, in the context in question 
l Delta conversion 
The built in unification procedure will do S-reduction on definitions if necessary, 
i.e., it may expand abbreviating names. 
The unification also recognizes outermost q-eqwality for objects, SO that it can 
use the lambda abstraction rule to verify given application objects where the functor 
has not been provided with the full number of arguments. This can be regarded as 
the inverse operation of “unfolding” I7-abstractions to clauses. The implemented 
unification procedure will always yield at most one unifier. If complicated higher 
order unification is required, two options are available: (1) Provide appropriate 
auxiliary definitions to obtain the desired result (cf. predl in the derivation example), 
(2) Interactively substitute a template of the desired proof object by hand. Checking 
objects (also those that cannot be constructed by the unification) is always possible, 
because all relevant terms are known then. 
The Constructor system automatically proves the example from the previous 
section without delay. As another example, the system constructs the proof for 
Tarski’s Lemma as formalised by Huet [22], a famous example from constructive 
mathematics, either by first proving the lemmas as propo,ed in [22], or by direct 
automatic construction of the complete proof. The example runs within seconds. 
The search strategy confirms that the proofs given by Huet [22] are indeed the 
shortest proofs. See also Fig. 2. As an example of a large proof (1500 lines), the 
system has been used to interactively construct a proof of Girard’s paradox, formalis- 
ing a proof in [4]. This proof was conducted in a GTS known as AU. The system’s 
contribution to this effort was considerable. All le~-~- -1’ 111 LQp were cOnstrxtcd top-down, 
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in close cooperation between user and machine. In a scenario like this, the system 
does the clerical work of automatically solving the “easy” lemmas and proof 
obligations, while the user selects the crucial proof steps. The final proof consists 
of 210 definitions, 63 of which are lemmas. If the proof is converted into a single 
h-term, its size measured 36 thousand characters. When the lemmas are s-reduced, 
the term size increases by 5. Finally, when all definitions are expanded, the size of 
the resulting term is 72 times the size of the original term. For the complete proof 
term derived by Constructor, see [4]. 
The performance of the system is good. On SUN 4 workstations, the system 
performs on an average 4000 unifications every second (including possible /3 and 
S-reductions). Currently, no clause compilation takes place. Automatic construction 
of the proofs shown in the figures runs in seconds. 
9. Related systems 
The Nuprl system by Constable et al. [7] offers an interesting and impressive 
interactive proof development enviro:lment hat is also based on type theory (Martin- 
L?_if’s Type Theory [25]). It is a significant improvement over the LCF proof system 
[ 151 that strongly influenced it. There is an inconvenience in the Nuprl system that 
has been overcome by the method proposed in this document. Proof construction 
in Nuprl is not based on unification based clausal resolution. The inference rules 
are the correctness rules for the underlying type theory, and implications in a context 
cannot be used directly as derived rules to resolve goals. Defining a new rule requires 
a detailed knowledge of the system and the programming language ML. Goals are 
posed in the elmpty context, and there is no notion of a theory describing the domain 
of interest and defining the proper axioms and inference rules. Thus, the desired 
context hypotheses are given as implications with the goal, and introduced later 
with introduction rulec. As unification is not directly available, derivation of new 
hypotheses by instantiating others is often demanded, i.e., variables need to be given 
that could have been calculated. Automated theorem proving has not yet been 
accomplished with the system [7, p. 131. 
One of the most powerful existing proof systems is Isabelle [27,28]. Comparison 
to this system is difficult, because Isabelle is a generic theorem prover, whereas the 
proof method proposed here is dedicated to only one single proof formalism, viz. 
type theory. The same remark can be made for a comparison to the work of Fetty 
and Miller on theorem provers [ 131. 
To the knowledge of the author, three systems are currently under development 
that have similar objectives as the method proposed here, viz. assistance for proof 
construction in type theory. One of them is the LEG0 system by Pollack in 
Edinburgh. First prototype implementations of this system are operational. Another 
effort is the ALF system, that is implemented by Nordstrom and Coquand. Finally, 
Dowek [ 1 l] is developing an implementation of a mathematical vernacular for the 
136 L. Helmink 
Calculus of Constructions. As these systems are still in development, it is too early 
for a comparison. 
8. Discwssiolr 
The method presented combines the power of type theory with the advantages 
of resolution inference. The advantages of resolution inference are that it is simp!e 
and that it can be implemented efficiently. 
Because proof construction is not decidable, strategic information has to be 
provided by users, either in the form of interactive choices, or in the form of 
algorithms (tactics). Resolution inference allows easy writing of tactics. The method 
presented may have potential to be used as a logic programming language, that 
includes all the essential features of e.g. Prolog, but that also provides typing, higher 
order facilities (this implies correct handling of expressions containing binders’ and 
the use of local assumptions, thereby creating the possibility to handle queries 
containing universal quantification or implication (much like A Prolog [26]). Note 
that the resulting derivations are in a natural deduction style. 
As a meta-language, the C’IT formalism is suitable to specify logical systems. The 
method presented makes the object level inference rules of a logic directly available 
for resolution instead of just the underlying correctness rules of CTT, thus offering 
the appropriate inference level. The abbreviation mechanism providtis the possibility 
for hiding and the use of derived lemmas. 
The requirement hat contexts are always grounded in derivations is essential to 
the method, because it avoids the problem of unification over contexts and prevents 
the undesired generation of new axioms, while permitting extrtiction of necessary 
derived Horn clauses. The consequences of this restriction are directly related to a 
fundamental problem in higher order theorem proving. 
It should be noted that proofs constructed by the method are in P-normal form, 
aside from definitions. In other words, the proofs constructed are cut-free. The 
proofs are not guaranteed in q-normal form, unless outermost q-reduction on 
objects is provided. 
Actual implementations of proof system can efficiently handle many issues. A 
version of such a proof system, Constructor, automatically constructed some non- 
trivial proofs. 
For an elaborate theoretical treatment of the proof construction method proposed 
in this paper, the reader is referred to [IS]. That paper gives correctness proofs for 
the inference method, and the method is extended towards Barendregt’s generalised 
type systems (GTS) [3 J. 
Of course fully automated theorem proving cannot be the objective of proof 
systems. Proof construction is an interactive game between user and proof system, 
where the system plays the role of an interactive assistant. In this approach, the 
user does the essential proof steps. This includes proposing useful lemmas and 
Resolurion and ype ~lwor> 137 
selecting crucial inference steps during the proof process. The machine task consists 
of the verification of details and solving the “easy” lemmas and (sub-)goals during 
the assembly of the main proof. Machines cannot do everything. 
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